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Abstract 
We evaluate recent inflation-targeting using Brazilian data and also consider the framework of the 
macroeconomic model of adaptive learning blended with a cognitive psychology approach. We 
suggest that forecasters interpret the inflation target as an anchor, and adjust to it accordingly. As 
current inflation increases above the target level, a central bank loses credibility, and forecasters 
start the adjustment from the top because they expect an even higher future inflation. Then, they 
move back to the core target within a range of uncertainty, but the adjustment is likely to end be-
fore the core is reached, as predicted by the psychological theory of anchors. After calibrating the 
model, we find an asymptotic equilibrium of a 6.1 percent inflation rate, which overshoots the 
announced target inflation core of 4.5 percent. This example casts doubt on the very justification 
for inflation targeting, which is unlikely to succeed when private forecasters rely on anchoring 
heuristics. 
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1. Introduction 
In the last 20 years, many academic macroeconomists [1] [2] and policymakers worldwide have been favoring 
the adoption of a monetary policy framework called “inflation targeting.” Its alleged advantages are lower, less 
variable inflation and interest rates, and more stable economic growth. This harmonious environment could be 
attainable because of an enhanced ability of central banks to respond credibly to the random shocks hitting 
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economies. It has to be said, however, that this standpoint remains popular despite the fact that evidence on the 
effectiveness of inflation targeting is mixed. One key study [3] showed that, when compared with economies 
that did not adopt inflation targeting, its use by a group of developed economies could not be credited to bring-
ing down inflation and inflation volatility. For “emerging” economies, adoption of inflation targeting did not re-
ceive empirical support for boosting economic growth [2]. Our study adds to skeptical literature: We take Bra-
zilian data and find that its inflation targeting is unlikely to succeed when private forecasters rely on anchoring 
heuristics. This result was evident after we adopted a new cognitive psychology perspective in connection with 
the traditional macroeconomic approach of bounded rationality with adaptive learning in the inflation forecasts. 
2. Materials and Methods 
We collected raw inflation data based on monthly series of the Brazilian broad price index (called IPCA) from 
November 2001 to September 2013. We considered datapoints of monthly frequency, and used the last day of 
the month as representative of a month. An alternative date could be the day after the release of the so-called 
IPCA-15 (an index strongly correlated with the IPCA; correlation = 0.986). We choose the last day of the month 
because forecasters are already in possession on that date of the information of the previous month’s inflation. 
The data on inflation forecasts made by professional forecasters (called “market expectation system”) are 
considered by the Brazilian central bank for the following 12 months (“the long run”). We took the inflation ex-
pectation data from such a central bank source and considered, as usual, the median of the time interval from 
November 2001 to September 2013. The median value was used in our analysis for calibrating the forecasters’ 
predictions 12 months forthcoming, from October 2002 to August 2014. The median is taken to prevent possible 
distortions in forecasts collected on a daily basis. The median is also justified because the central bank can lose 
credibility in the meantime, in which case private forecasters tend not to reveal their true expectations. All the 
data employed in this work are available at http://dx.doi.org/10.6084/m9.figshare.1310598.  
Competition between the professional forecasters is promoted by the Brazilian central bank, which rewards 
the year’s top five forecasters. This aims to improve the quality of data collected from the market expectation 
system. As a result of this incentive mechanism, we considered the source of data rather than the alternative of 
gauging the inflation expectations embodied in the prices of assets. However, the central bank data themselves 
are far from perfect. Table 1 shows the top five private forecasters for 2009 to 2013. Any conclusions from  
Table 1 will fall victim to the “law of small numbers,” because the data are collected for only five years. How-
ever, if the pattern in Table 1 continues as more and more years are added in the future, one can infer the central 
bank is rewarding luck rather than forecasting talent. Indeed, there is no consistent winner among those in the 
top five each year. Apparently, no central bank officer seems to have compared the annual data as we did in  
Table 1, which is strongly suggestive of “regression to the mean” at work: A high-performance forecaster one 
year becomes a poor forecaster in the next. Table 1 also reveals mean regression for the annual sets of forecast 
errors. Groups of forecasters seem to make similar predictions, which result in either high or low aggregate sets 
of forecast errors. The consequence is an annual cycle for their errors: In 2009 the errors were low, but they 
went up the next year (2010). The errors dropped in 2011, and they increased in 2012, only to drop again in 
2013. Interestingly, this phenomenon was also detected for the United States [4]. 
Nowadays macroeconomists usually favor a bounded rationality approach when considering how forecasters 
predict inflation. We considered, in particular, the model of adaptive learning [5]. Early modeling approaches 
involved considering previous inflation (the adaptive expectation model) as well as rational forecasters who em-
ploy a subjective probability distribution that matches the objective probability distribution of inflation forecasts 
(the rational expectation model). In the rational expectation model, all past information is fully available to all 
forecasters and is equally used by them. As a result, forecasts are homogeneous and data, as those displayed in 
Table 1, cannot be explained [4]. It is not surprising that evidence for the rational expectation model is poor [6]. 
The adaptive learning approach is a bounded rationality model in that forecasters have to choose their per-
ceived best model of forecast in the absence of full information. Forecasters are assumed to use a statistical 
model to estimate a “perceived law of motion” (PLM) of the parameters involved in forecasting. This estimate is 
then subjectively maximized, resulting in a temporary “actual law of motion” (ALM). Reestimations of the PLM 
may occur after the feedback with past forecasting performance, a feature that allows calibrating the model with 
actual data. The process is described by a differential equation that uses the estimated parameters in the PLM. 
Asymptotically, the adaptive learning process may reach a rational expectation equilibrium. However, the PLM 
is not always an optimal learning strategy, in which case forecasters miss the rational expectation equilibrium. 
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Table 1. Top 5 forecasters of the long run IPCA index.                                                             
Year/ranking Private forecaster Forecast error 
2009   
1 Banco CR2 S.A. 0.09 
2 Petros Fundação Petrobrás de Seguridade Social 0.0955 
3 Mauá Consultoria de Investimentos e Econômica Ltda. 0.1065 
4 Banco do Brasil S.A. 0.1147 
5 ING Bank N.V. 0.1159 
2010   
1 Claritas Administradora de Recursos Ltda. 0.3364 
2 Opportunity Asset 0.3371 
3 Safra Asset Management 0.4479 
4 Banco Itaú Asset Management 0.4480 
5 JGP Gestão de Recursos 0.4491 
2011   
1 Barclays Capital 0.1221 
2 BNY Mellon ARX Investimentos 0.1436 
3 BW Gestão de Investimentos Ltda 0.1599 
4 Kondor Admnistração e Gestão de Recursos Financeiros Ltda. 0.1699 
5 Safra Asset Management 0.1918 
2012   
1 BW Gestão de Investimentos Ltda. 0.2985 
2 Credit Suisse Hedging-Griffo AM S.A. 0.3123 
3 HSBC Asset Management 0.3263 
4 Banco BNP Paribas Brasil S.A. 0.3602 
5 Rabobank Internacional Brasil 0.4056 
2013   
1 Banco Mizuho do Brasil S.A. 0.0826 
2 Brasil Plural Gestão de Recursos 0.0827 
3 Mirae Asset Global Investiments Brazil 0.0987 
4 MB Associados 0.1023 
5 BNP Paribas Asset Management Brasil Ltda. 0.1041 
Source: Brazilian central bank. 
 
The process of mapping from the PLM to the ALM is called “expectational stability” or “E-stability.” Such 
E-stability is similar to that of the rational expectation model. If the dynamics do not converge to the rational 
expectation equilibrium, it can be modeled assuming learning with a “constant-gain estimator” ta a=  [7] de-
fined as: 
1
1 ,t t i tia Et
π−== ∑                                           (1) 
where E is the expectation operator and π  is the inflation rate. 
The PLM takes into account the constant-gain estimator and is defined as 
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1 ,t t taπ µ α υ−= + +                                     (2) 
where µ  and α  are parameters, and tυ  is an error term. Forecasters are assumed to behave as econometri- 
cians and use ordinary least squares as their statistical model. Thus, through “least squares learning,” Equation 
(2) can be used to estimate the ALM. 
E-stability provided by a differential equation formulation offers the most suitable condition for stability 
under adaptive learning rules using least squares [5]: 
d .
d
a a a
t
µ α= + −                                      (3) 
Equation (3) is then calibrated with the values of µ  and α  estimated from Equation (2). One can then as-
sess whether there is convergence to a fixed point, that is, whether the convergence condition of E-stability 
1α <                                               (4) 
is met. As t →∞  and d d 0a t =  the particular solution is the unique equilibrium given by: 
( ) 11 .a µ α −= −                                       (5) 
The algorithm (1)-(5) can also be used as an experimental framework where heuristics can be invoked [8]. 
The types of heuristic considered are classic: Substituting one question for another for solving a difficult prob-
lem. We keep the above formalism, but replace the classic heuristic with a cognitive-psychology heuristic to 
evaluate the experience of inflation targeting. In the cognitive psychology sense, heuristic is a simple procedure 
that helps find adequate, though often imperfect, answers to difficult questions [9]. 
“Prediction is very difficult, especially if it is about the future,” goes the adage independently advanced by 
both physicist Niels Bohr and baseball superstar Yogi Berra. This means forecasters will find it difficult to pre-
dict inflation. That is why they will consider forecasting heuristics. From the perspective of cognitive psycholo-
gy the first aspect to note is that the inflation target is an anchor for the forecasters. The anchoring heuristic oc-
curs when people consider a particular value for an unknown quantity before estimating the quantity [9]. The es-
timates usually stay close to the number that people considered, hence the image of an anchor. Two different 
types of psychological mechanisms produce anchoring effects: 1) anchoring that occurs in a deliberate process 
of adjustment, an operation of the mind’s “system 2”; and 2) anchoring that occurs by a “priming effect,” an au-
tomatic manifestation of “system 1.” (Priming effects refer to “suggestion,” which selectively evokes compatible 
evidence [9].) In the first type, people start from an anchoring number (such as the inflation target), assess if it is 
too high or too low (considering their prediction based on current inflation, for instance), and gradually adjust 
their estimate by mentally “moving” from the anchor. This adjustment is a labored operation and is likely to end 
prematurely because people stop when they are no longer certain that they should move further: There is a range 
of uncertainty. They will stop near the bottom of the region of uncertainty when they start from the bottom, and 
near the top of the region when they start from the top [9]. 
In terms of inflation targeting we considered the anchoring heuristics for forecasting as the first type, because 
the work of professional forecasters requires such effort. The announced target can be interpreted as the core of 
a region of uncertainty for the private forecasters, because they are uncertain that the central bank will meet the 
target. The forecasters start their mental predictions considering the anchor represented by the announced target. 
Then, depending on the monetary policy moves and the effects on current inflation, the forecasters adjust their 
estimates (and this can be thought of as a kind of learning) by mentally moving from the anchor. For example, if 
a central bank loses credibility as current inflation increases and menaces to depart from the core, the forecasters 
start the adjustment from the top because they are likely to expect an even higher future inflation. Then, they 
move back to the core within the range of uncertainty, but the adjustment is likely to end before the core is 
reached. As we will see, this example fits the interpretation we will provide for our results. 
We find it useful to compute an anchoring index, A, for the inflation target tπ  (adapted from Ref. [10]) as 
follows: 
12
12
12
12
,
,
t t
t t t
t
t
t t t
t t
E
E
A
E
E
π
π π
π
π
π π
π
−
−
−
−
 <
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 >

                                 (6) 
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The first line in Equation (6) applies to situations when forecasters start the adjustment from the bottom be-
cause they estimate that inflation is below the target, 12t t tE π π− <  (forecasts are made 20 months ahead). The 
second line in Equation (6) refers to the cases where forecasters start the adjustment from the top because they 
think inflation overshot the target, 12t t tE π π− > . Of note, the adjustment improves as 1A → , in which case the 
range of uncertainty is shortened. The limit case 1A =  corresponds to full central bank credibility, which in 
our model is only asymptotically reached. The greater the credibility, the shorter the range of uncertainty, and 
the more accurate the adjustment toward the anchor. As such, it is not surprising that our A-index is strongly 
correlated with conventional “credibility indices” from the macroeconomic literature (see Figure 2 below). 
Figure 2 shows this correlation using the credibility index C suggested in Ref. [11]: 
12100 100 .
2
t tEC
π− −= −  
 
                                   (7) 
The anchoring index (6) is different for each forecaster. In the adaptive learning framework, there is no reason 
for assuming from the start that expectations are homogeneous. However, due to the feedback with the envi-
ronment in the evaluation of past performance, learning allows the commuting of individual anchoring heuristics. 
The degree of heterogeneity in a given time period of the learning process can be gauged by a Pearson correla-
tion, dividing the standard deviation by the mean. So the less the dispersion is between the individual forecasts 
on a given date, the greater the homogeneity of the forecasts. However, because the Pearson coefficient assumes 
the degree of heterogeneity is evaluated relative to the mean, it is useless in the presence of marked skewness. 
Fortunately, this restriction does not apply to our data, because we found the individual forecasts to be roughly 
symmetrically distributed (available upon request). 
3. Results 
Figure 1 shows the inflation target and actual inflation for the time period considered. To measure the degree to 
which the inflation target was considered in the private forecasts, Figure 2 plots the anchoring index (6). The  
 
 
Figure 1. Brazilian inflation target and actual inflation: November 30, 
2001 to September 30, 2013.                                              
 
 
Figure 2. Anchoring and credibility indices for November 30, 2001 
to March 28, 2013.                                                      
E. Da Silva, S. Da Silva 
 
OALibJ | DOI:10.4236/oalib.1101450 6 April 2015 | Volume 2 | e1450 
 
anchoring index gauges the usefulness of the announced target as a base rate and it co-varies with the credibility 
index (7). 
Figure 3 shows the calculated Pearson coefficients tracking the degree of expectation heterogeneity over time. 
For example, take the time span from 2003 to 2005 in Figure 3. The anchoring index dropped, and expectations 
became more heterogeneous than those of the final period (say, 2012 to 2013), but they were still less hetero- 
geneous than those from the beginning (say, 2001 to 2002). Of note: On July 30, 2004 and March 28, 2013, the 
anchoring indices were roughly the same. But the fact that expectation heterogeneity was lower in the final 
period suggests forecaster learning was at play. 
When inflation accelerates, the central bank’s credibility plummets, and then the anchoring index drops. This 
means actual inflation becomes more relevant for forecasts than the target inflation. Here we arguably are in the 
second line of the A-index (6). The adjustment starts from the top and we expect it to stop well above the anchor 
given by the inflation target. 
As the private forecasters learn that actual inflation becomes a better predictor, expectations turn more homo- 
geneous, and this reduces “inflation surprise” (actual minus expected inflation). Because the same actual in- 
flation ends up generating less inflation surprise, this again strongly suggests an underlying process of learning 
at work. Take the final years in Figure 4, for example. Inflation surprise becomes tamed and the anchoring in- 
dex shows a reduction. This means learning is improved (because inflation surprise is reduced), despite the fact 
that forecasters are relying less on the target (the anchoring index drops). 
Considering the constant-gain estimator given by Equation (1) into the PLM Equation (2), we can estimate 
 
 
Figure 3. Learning at work: Expectation heterogeneity and anchoring index.               
 
 
Figure 4. Both inflation surprise and the anchoring index progressively de- 
crease. This means learning is improved without the need to rely on the 
target: November 30, 2001 to May 31, 2013.                              
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parameters µ  and α  (Table 2). 
Note that 1α <  in Table 2, thus satisfying the E-stability convergence condition (4). Calibrating the 
E-stability differential Equation (3) with the estimated parameters in Table 2, after considering the particular 
solution (5), we are certain that inflation forecasts do converge to an asymptotical equilibrium for the estimated 
1.1α = − . Figure 5 shows a visualization of the convergence process toward the adaptive learning expectation 
equilibrium, which can be calculated as: 
( )( ) 113.0333 1 1.13594
6.101904.
a
a
−
= − −
=
 
Considering the inflation target of 4.5 ± 2 percent announced for the final period by the Brazilian central bank 
(Figure 1), we conclude the forecasters did not believe the core target of 4.5 percent. They expected 6.1 percent 
inflation, which is near the upper band of tolerance of 6.5 percent. The reason: lack of credibility in the an-
nounced target; increase in the range of uncertainty; and the resulting anchoring-heuristic adjustment starting 
from the top with a final estimate above the target. Importantly, when approaching the asymptotic value of 6.1 
percent, the private forecasters succeed in reducing their forecasting error and subsequently in lowering the he-
terogeneity of their predictions. 
Of course, our adaptive learning equilibrium does not collapse to the rational expectation equilibrium. Table 
3 presents the results of four tests commonly employed [12] to assess forecast rationality. 
Testing for bias (test A) is the simplest way to evaluate forecast accuracy. The test assess whether inflation 
expectations are centered on the “right” value. The accuracy is gauged by the constant ε  regressed on the fore- 
cast errors (inflation surprise), 12t t tEπ π−− . A positive mean error indicates private forecasters are underesti-
mating inflation. The magnitude 1.09 shown in Table 3 is large enough for one to reject the hypothesis of fore-
cast accuracy without significant errors. This means forecasters, on average, showed significant forecast biases 
(errors). 
Test B evaluates whether there is information in the predictions that could be used to predict the inflation sur-
prise. Accepting the null hypothesis of rationality means no other information conveys prediction power over 
inflation. The p-value of 0.015 shown in Table 3 means the null could not be accepted. Thus, the information 
conveyed by the expected inflation in the actual moment the forecasts were made was not completely exploited. 
 
Table 2. Actual law of motion of the Brazilian inflation: Decem-
ber 2001 to September 2013).                                 
Parameters of Equation (2) 
µ  α  
13.0333* −1.1359* 
Note: *significant at 1 percent. 
 
 
Figure 5. Convergence to the adaptive learning equilibrium. This is 
the time window from the sample: November 30, 2001 to March 28, 
2013. From the model’s Equation (5), we find 6.1a = .                 
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Table 3. Tests of forecast rationality.                                  
Test A 
Testing for bias 
12t t tEπ π ε−− =  
 
ε : mean error (constant only) 1.09 (0.239348)* 
Test B 
Is the information in the forecast fully exploited? 
12 12t t t t tE Eπ π ε β π− −− = +  
β  −0.38 (0.1564)** 
ε  3.15 (0.8692)* 
Adjusted R² 0.034 
p-value 0.015 
Test C 
Are forecasting errors persistent? 
( )12 12 24 12t t t t t tE Eπ π ε β π π− − − −− = + −  
β  0.961 (0.023)* 
ε  0.02 (0.07) 
Adjusted R² 0.925 
Test D 
Are the macroeconomic data fully exploited? 
12 12 13 13 13t t t t t t t tE E i uπ π ε β π γπ κ δ− − − − −− = + + + +  
ε  −0.973 (1.13) 
β  −0.251 (0.193) 
γ  0.064 (0.132) 
κ  −0.348 (0.113)* 
δ  0.888 (0.175)* 
Adjusted R² 0.21 
p-value 0 
Note: Standard deviation in parentheses; *significant at 1 percent; **significant at 5 percent. 
 
Test C assesses whether today’s forecast error can be used to predict tomorrow’s error (serial autocorrelation). 
If expectations are rational, serial autocorrelation cannot exist. Table 3 shows coefficient 0.961β =  signifi-
cant at 1 percent. Thus forecasters presented error autocorrelation, which violated rational expectations. Howev-
er, the fact that the forecast errors in 1t −  persisted in t  is also compatible with objective, incomplete infor-
mation rather than subjective, bounded rationality. This is because the realease of inflation data by the Brazilian 
authorities occurred with a one-month lag and even then, the errors were not entirely revealed. 
Test D examines whether public macroeconomic information was taken into account by forecasters in their 
predictions. The test runs a regression considering the expectations of current IPCA inflation rate formed with a 
12-month lag 12t tE π− , actual inflation 13tπ − , an unemployment rate 13tu −  and an interest base rate (called 
SELIC) 13ti − , published in the month preceding the date when the forecasts were made (the series began in Oc-
tober 2001). Table 3 shows that the variables relative to the expectations of inflation were not statistically sig-
nificant. However, the coefficient related to unemployment was positive and significant ( )0.888δ = . This val-
ue is considered high and implies that an increase in unemployment was followed by a reduction in inflation 
expectations for the next period, a pattern called “Phillips curve.” This, in turn, raised the forecast errors, which 
means an underestimation of the inflation forecasts during periods of growing unemployment. Finally, contrac-
tionary monetary policy (an increase in variable 13ti − ) could not reduce the inflation forecasts, which means an 
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overestimation and a negative forecast error. 
4. Discussion 
When central banks adopt inflation targeting they create an illusion of the understanding of and control of infla-
tion forecasts. They tend to understate the uncertainty of forecasting the future. The basic reason: They rely on 
models that assume the random shocks hitting the economies are independent and identically distributed. Jumps 
that lead to non-i.i.d. forecasts are dismissed by design, which means central banks assume economic shocks are 
of mild type I randomness [13]. However, this assumption is not rooted on the past evidence of inflation forecast 
behavior. Indeed, in interwar Germany, hyperinflation was fed by scalable inflation forecasts, a feature most 
macroeconomists and central bankers are aware of. As a consequence, the German currency moved from 3 to a 
dollar to 4 trillion to a dollar in just a few years during the 1920s. This is wild type II randomness [13]. 
Our finding of an asymptotic adaptive learning equilibrium that overshoots the anchor is thus dependent on 
both the adaptive learning model we consider as a framework [5], which assumes mild randomness, and the par-
ticular data used to calibrate the model, which did not present scalable inflation forecasts in the period consi-
dered. We took recent Brazilian data for the variable, not those of interwar Germany—the observation window 
was not large enough to include substantial deviations. Sums of i.i.d. finite variance random variables asymptot-
ically approach a Gaussian distribution. Concepts, such as standard deviation, variance, correlation, R-square, 
and ordinary least squares, acquire meaning only if the environment is Gaussian [13]. The adaptive learning 
model we consider was designed within this environment of nonscalable randomness, and it is not surprising 
that “least squares learning” reaches an asymptotic equilibrium. So our result was obtained within this Gaussian 
environment. For this very reason the result is conservative because things could be even worse in a wild ran-
domness environment. Here, inflation forecasts may not reach any fixed point equilibrium, as in the German 
example, and inflation targets end up useless. 
5. Conclusions 
While predicting, forecasters may use simple heuristics (simple rules, usually imperfect, aiming to find answers 
to questions of difficult judgment). We consider this cognitive psychology perspective to the conventional ma-
croeconomic literature of bounded rationality with adaptive learning and suggest the presence of an anchoring 
heuristic at work for predicting the inflation target. The treatment considered Brazilian data. 
Calibrating the data to the dynamic convergence of an adaptive learning asymptotical state, we found the pro-
fessional forecasters to increasingly homogenize their forecasts, but the convergence value of the inflation ex-
pectation overshot the official announced target. 
We found that the forecasters didn’t believe the core target of 4.5 percent, and instead used a forecast of 6.1 
percent inflation, which was near the upper band of 6.5 percent because the tolerance range was 2± . This ex-
ample spoils the very justification for inflation targeting because it shows the target is unlikely to work when 
private forecasters rely on anchoring heuristics. 
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